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“We learned about honesty and integrity - that the truth matters... that you don't take 
shortcuts or play by your own set of rules... and success doesn't count unless you earn it fair 
and square.” 
                                                                                                                     (Michelle Obama) 
 
 
 
“Hunger is a political question, not just a technical problem. We need markets, of course, but 
we also need a vision for the future that goes beyond short-term fixes. The global food system 
will always need firefighters. But what we need more urgently are architects to design a more 
fire-resistant system.” 
                                                (Olivier De Schutter, United Nations Human Rights Council) 
 
 
“When billions of dollars of capital is put to work in small markets like agricultural 
commodities, it inevitably increases volatility and amplifies prices – and if financial flows 
amplify prices of food stuffs and energy, it's not like real estate and stocks. When food prices 
double, people starve.”	  
                                                                                      (Mike Masters, Hedge fund manager)  
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Abstract 
 
This thesis examine how speculative activities in the commodity futures market affect the 
commodity spot prices. The relationship between the commodity futures volume of contracts 
traded, open interest, speculative open interest and the commodity spot price are investigated. 
There is considerable disagreements about whether there exist a linkage here or not in the 
related literature. This study provides evidence that speculative activity do destabilize the 
commodity spot prices by increasing the volatility of the price process. 
 
KEYWORDS: Speculation, agriculture, futures market, GARCH-model. 
JEL-classification: G10, Q10. 
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1. Introduction 
	  
	  
“Food inflation has attracted speculators for short term profit at the expense of people living 
a dignified life.” 
                                                                                                (Paul Polman, CEO of Unilever) 
	  
	  
Food prices in the last decade have suffered from huge fluctuations, pushing millions of 
people, especially in developing countries, into poverty. Some people in the world spend 
more than half of their income on food, and some can actually spend up to 75 per cent on food 
and at the same time, they often rely heavily on food support1. This makes them very 
vulnerable to price and volatility fluctuations. The amount of undernourished people in the 
world topped 1 billion for the first time in 20092. This indicates that the global food crisis 
observed in the recent years has definitely left its mark. From 2007 to 2008, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) price index of internationally traded food commodity rose by 56 per 
cent and by the end of 2008 the agricultural commodity prices had fallen by 50 per cent 
again3. There were enormous daily fluctuations in this period as well, and some reporters 
compared the fluctuations of the prices of corn and wheat in a single day in this period to be 
as large as the price fluctuations observed in a whole year back in the 1990s4. Unfortunately, 
the decline in the commodity prices at the end of 2008 turned out to be short-term. In 2010-
2011 the prices rose rapidly again. Many researchers suggest that the price fluctuations 
observed derive from fundamental factors, such as supply and demand factors5. However, 
other researchers claim that the fundamental macro and microeconomic factors cannot fully 
explain the recent increase in commodity prices. One reason for this is that in the same period 
that the food prices fluctuated and reached all-time high levels, there has been remarkable 
structural changes in the commodity futures market. Trading volume and open interest have 
increased, and there have been some changes in the participants of the commodity markets6. 
Primarily the futures markets are associated with hedging purposes. Commodity futures can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 (Herman, Kelly, & Nash, 2011, p.2) 
2 (Clapp & Helleiner,2010, p.184) 
3 (Clapp & Helleiner,2010, p.184) 
4 (Clapp & Helleiner,2010, p.184) 
5 (Czech, 2013, p.11) 
6 (Czech, 2013, p.10)	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be a tool for companies and other users (such as farmers) to reduce risk. Commodities are 
heterogeneous, and they often provide high transportation and storage costs. Because of this, 
it is normal to hedge a risk with a commodity contract that is imperfectly correlated with the 
risk being hedged7. Another participant in the futures market are the so-called speculators. A 
speculator uses futures contracts to make a profit from movements in the futures prices8. This 
is different from a hedger, because the hedger uses futures contracts mainly to protect against 
price movements, like an insurance. The observed increase of speculators in the commodity 
market has made the commodity markets more like financial markets in terms of motivations 
and participants. This observed change in the commodity markets refers to the 
“financialization” of commodity markets9. The main purpose of this thesis is to determine if 
there exist any linkage between agricultural commodity speculation and the price in the 
physical markets for food. Many researches have used a descriptive approach to analyze this 
linkage, but in this analysis, there will be a more empirical approach using a generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model (GARCH). Other researchers have used 
similar models to try to identify this potential linkage, but in this analysis, the dataset is 
different in form of the length of the data and “outside shock” factors included in the 
conditional variance equation in the model. 
 
1.1 Outline 
	  
The thesis has several sections. Section 1 and 2 describes the motivation for the issue of the 
thesis and what type of research and results that already exist regarding the phenomenon. In 
section 3 there will be a formal explanation of the behavior of the prices in the financial 
market, with focus on the derivative market. The purpose of this section is to explain how 
prices behave in theory and how the different participants of the markets play a role in the 
price settling process. Subsection 3.1 contains a presentation of the efficient market 
hypothesis, a well-known theory of how price patterns in the financial markets can be 
explained. In subsection 3.2, different terms and dynamics of the derivative market are 
described, involving the different participants of the market and some definitions of futures 
contract that are used in the empirical part of the thesis. The Spot-futures parity theorem is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 (McDonald, 2013, p.185) 
8 (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2011, p.675) 
9 (Clapp & Helleiner, 2010, p.189)	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explained in subsection 3.3, and it shows how the price of the futures contract and the spot 
price of underlying product converge in time. Three different risk transfer hypothesis are 
discussed in subsection 3.4, and it shows how the futures contract price is equal to the 
expected future spot price of the asset. The purpose of including these theories is to give a 
presentation of how the futures contracts price dynamics are defined in theory. This is defined 
in an environment were all participant in the market are fully informed and there exists no 
uncertainties. This does not seem to fit with the situation of the real world, where there is a lot 
of information asymmetry and a lot of uncertainty. Could this uncertainty push up the prices 
of the futures contracts, and could this price increase affect the spot prices of the assets as 
well?  Section 4 covers the agricultural commodity market and how the dynamics of the 
market has changed in the last decades. It starts with a description of the price movements 
observed in a given time period (subsection 4.1), followed by some information about the 
global food crisis the world has faced in this period (subsection 4.1.1). Many researchers 
claim that the fundamental supply and demand factors is to blame for this observed movement 
of the prices, hence there will be presented of a theory regarding general equilibrium in the 
commodity market (subsection 4.2) to show how these fundamental factors could create an 
equilibrium set of market prices. The issue of a potential linkage between speculation and 
higher food prices has been highlighted and discussed a lot in the recent years, resulting in a 
lot of theories and ideas of different factors, other than the fundamental supply and demand 
factors, that may contribute to the observed price increase. In subsection 4.3 there is presented 
some of the main factors that seems to have affected the food prices and which has some sort 
of consensus between the majorities of the researchers in the field.  The effect of speculation 
is one of the factors mentioned and in subsection 4.4 this will be discussed further to motivate 
the empirical part of the thesis. Another important feature of the commodity market is the 
deregulation of the market observed since the millennium. Section 5 describes the de-
regulative process observed in the U.S commodity market in the given time period. This 
process has resulted in a higher proportion of speculative participants in the market, thus 
motivating the possible linkage between speculative activity and high food prices. The 
increase of speculative activity in the commodity market give rise to the term 
“financialization of the commodity market”, which is defined in subsection 5.2. The empirical 
part of the thesis starts in section 6. The testing procedure is presented, starting with a 
definition of the auto-correlation function in subsection 6.1, followed by another approach of 
testing the existence of autocorrelation known as the Ljung-Box test, and it is presented in 
subsection 6.2. Other important features such as normality and stationarity of the variables 
11	  
	  
and residual of the model needs to be tested, and the testing procedures is described in 
subsection 6.3 (normality test) and 6.4 (test for stationarity). Akaike`s information criteria was 
used to select the proper order of the mean equation of the main model, and the criteria is 
described in subsection 6.5. If there are ARCH-effects in the residuals of the mean-stationary 
stochastic process selected by Akaike`s information criteria, we have a case of 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals and this is the motivation for the main model used to test 
the potential speculative linkage. The ARCH-effects testing procedure is described in 
subsection 6.6. The dataset used in the model is described in section 7, and the features and 
dynamics of the underlying processes are discussed and showcased in subsection 7.1. To 
analyze the phenomenon I have applied a general autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity GARCH (1, 1) model, and in subsection 8.1 the methodology of the model 
is given. Subsection 8.2 contains the specific case I want to test, and the result of the model is 
presented. The discussion of my result compared to other findings is provided in subsection 
8.3, followed by a conclusion in section 9. In subsection 9.1, some future research is 
suggested based on the empirical results provided from this thesis.  
 
2. Literature review 
	  
With the rapid growth in commodity prices together with the observed financialization of the 
commodity futures market, many papers studies the co-movement between commodity 
futures and other assets, and how this may or may not affect the commodity price or the price 
volatility. Several papers also studies different types of traders, and how these different 
positions could be related to the observed price changes. The traders are often divided into 
two groups, the hedgers (also referred to as commercial traders) and the speculators (often 
referred as the non-commercial traders). Stoll & Whaley (2010) used 12 different commodity 
futures contracts from CFTC`s (U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission) supplemental 
report and two commodity indexes – the Standard and Poor`s Goldman Sachs Commodity 
Index (S&P-GSCI) and the Dow Jones UBS Commodity Index (DJ-UBSCI) to determine 
whether the rising phenomenon of commodity index investing is a disruptive force in the 
commodity futures market. They performed Granger-causality test on returns to determine the 
context. Their comprehensive study resulted in the conclusion that commodity index investing 
12	  
	  
is not speculation, and it does not affect or destabilize the futures price10. Bohl & Stephan 
(2013) investigated the growing market share of futures speculators to see if they destabilize 
commodity spot prices.  They used data from 6 agricultural and energy commodities and 
measured the returns of each asset. They used an autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH) model to analyze the phenomenon. They modeled the price changes as a first-order 
autoregressive (AR) process with a constant to account for possible return dependencies over 
time. The conditional volatility of the returns contained aggregate trading volume, aggregate 
open interest and speculative open interest. The basis of their main results provided evidence 
that speculators do not destabilize commodity spot prices in a large scale, and that 
financialization of raw material markets does not make them more volatile11. On the other 
side, Cooke & Robles (2009) performed a study with the purpose to try to find possible 
explanations for the movements in commodity prices observed form 2006-2008. They 
analyzed many possible factors that could explain the rise in agricultural prices, and one of 
the factors was the increased activity in the futures market. In the analysis, they looked at the 
price movements of 4 different agricultural commodities, and they used the volume of 
commodity futures, open interest of futures contracts and noncommercial to total trade ratio 
as a proxy of speculation. They used first difference models and granger causality tests to see 
if there exists any linkage. The study provides empirical evidence that financial activity and 
speculation in futures markets can help explain the behavior of the commodity prices in the 
period. In fact, in their findings, the financial activity in futures market and proxies for 
speculation were the only factor supported to have an effect on the rise in the commodity 
prices by the time series analysis, any other explanation were not well supported12. Varadi 
(2012) provided a study with the purpose to investigate for the evidence and impact of 
speculation on volatility of commodity prices in the Indian Commodity markets. The analysis 
mainly focused on the period of 2006-2010, to include the financial crisis that occurred in that 
period. Data from the Forward Markets Commission in India (FMC) were used and the 
econometric approach used was multivariate GARCH estimations and VAR Granger-
causality tests. Volume of futures contracts, value of the contracts and open interest in the 
future contract market were used as a proxy for speculation. Varadi`s study provide empirical 
evidence for “speculation” during the crisis period which might be a cause for the excessive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 (Stoll & Whaley, 2010) 
11 (Bohl & Stephan, 2013) 
12 (Cooke & Robles, 2009) 
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volatility observed in the commodity markets in the given time period13. It shows that 
speculation can cause unreasonable price fluctuations. The idea of a possible linkage between 
speculative trading and increased food prices has engaged many researchers, and there exists 
big differences regarding the potential linkage. To provide a starting point to further 
investigate the linkage, it is important to have a basic understanding of how the financial 
market and physical market are interrelated. Different theories and dynamics of these markets 
will be provided in the two following sections. 
	  
3. Financial markets and theories 
	  
Financial markets in one way or another affects all people in the world. One example is when 
people invest their savings in mutual funds, they invest in stocks and bonds from companies 
all over the world. This means that they are not heavily exposed to one company only and this 
can reduce the risk of the investment. Another example is a company that wants to insure 
itself against certain risks. It could protect itself of currency changes, interest rate changes and 
commodity price changes that could give the company adverse consequences. This could be 
done through the global derivatives market. Risk sharing is definitely one of the most 
important functions of the financial markets14. In general, the financial markets can be defined 
as “a forum for the exchange of financial products, represented in some cases by a physical 
location, but in others by a common information system sharing data on prices and volume 
transacted, and where a number of professionals take an active part in the processes of the 
market”15 (Fell, 2000, p.18).  
The risk of an investment can be divided into two components: diversifiable and non-
diversifiable risk16. Diversifiable risk is characterized by random events that are company-
specific. This is also referred to as unsystematic risk, and this type of risk can be eliminated 
by diversification. Non-diversifiable risk attributes to more general forces that we cannot 
control. This type of risk does not vanish when spread across many investors like diversifiable 
risk do. The sum of these two components of risks is referred to as the total risk. The financial 
market serves two purposes17. It permits diversifiable risk to be shared all over the world; this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 (Varadi, 2012) 
14 (McDonald, 2013, p.10) 
15 (Fell, 2000, p.18) 
16 (Gitman, Joehnk, Smart, Jochau, Ross, & Wright, 2011, p.144) 
17 (McDonald, 2013, p.11) 
14	  
	  
makes it possible to vanish out this type of risk when it is widely shared. At the same time, 
non-diversifiable risk is permitted, but it does not vanish when widely shared, and can be held 
by those who are most willing to hold it. In theory, the fundamental economic idea is that 
risk-sharing mechanisms benefits everyone18. 
3.1 The efficient market hypothesis 
	  
In the 1950`s business cycle theorists traced the evolution of economic variables over time to 
(among other things) analyze the behavior of the stock market prices. Maurice Kendall was 
one of these theorists and in 1953, he discovered that there is no predictable pattern in the 
stock prices19. The price movements observed in the market seemed to evolve randomly, and 
it soon became apparent that the random price movements indicated a well-functioning 
market. This means that the prices do not follow any particular pattern, and they are as likely 
to increase as they are to decrease. Because of the random movement of the prices, there is no 
way of predicting the future prices based on the previous prices. Had it been the case that 
historical performance does affect the current price, investors could have made money very 
easily. They could all earn profits by investing in stocks that were predicted to increase and 
sell those stocks that are about to decrease. Because of this, it is said that any information that 
could be used to predict the stock performance is already included in the stock prices20. As 
soon as there exists any indication of an underpriced or overpriced stock that could provide 
some sort of profit for an investor, the investors flock to buy (or sell) the stock and this 
immediately bid up the price to a fair level. The price reaches its fair level, given all available 
information, in response to new information available. This new information is unpredictable, 
because if it could be predicted it would be a part of today`s information. The idea that stock 
prices reflect all available information is referred to as the efficient market hypothesis21. 
In general, the efficient market hypothesis consists of three versions: the weak, semistrong 
and strong form22. The main difference of these versions is the definition of the term “all 
information available”. The weak-form involves information that can be derived from 
examining the market trading data only. The semistrong-form contains all public available 
information such as forecasted earnings, patents, management (and so on), including 
information of historical trading data involved in the weak-form. The strong-form contains the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 (McDonald, 2013, p.11) 
19 (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, p.371)	  
20 (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, p.372) 
21 (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, p.373) 
22 (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, p.375)	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same as the weak and semistrong-form, but it also includes available information from 
company insiders. This is an extreme version, and information from “insiders” is considered 
as illegal in most parts of the world. The semistrong-form is the most common because it 
states that the stock price reflect all information that is publicly known for all participants in 
the market. 
The efficient market hypothesis has been widely discussed among portfolio managers, 
because it basically states that they are wasting their time trying to earn abnormal returns in a 
market that provides no arbitrage opportunities. Is the market as efficient as the hypothesis 
claims? There exists many different opinions on this, and there are some factors that trigger 
these disagreements. Two examples of such factors are the magnitude issue, and the selection 
bias issue23. The magnitude issue derives from the fact that even though the prices are close to 
fair prices, a very small performance could provide huge annual earnings for large 
investments. This small contribution of the investment will be swamped by the yearly 
volatility of the market and there is no way of measuring this single contribution. So if the 
market is meant to be efficient, how efficient is it really? This challenges the basic concept of 
the efficient market hypothesis. Another issue is the selection bias issue. This derives from the 
fact that if you contain valuable information about an investment that could result in huge 
profit earnings, would you share this information to achieve some sort of public recognition, 
or would you keep the secret and take the profit yourself? If any investor chooses the second 
statement, this would violate the assumption of information available in the efficient market 
hypothesis. There is a lot of research done in this field, and there are some that find evidence 
of abnormal returns, but because of the high competition in the market, only superior 
information or insight has a potential of earning money24. In general, the conclusion is that the 
markets are efficient from a large point of view, but there exists some rewards to the 
intelligent or creative investors in the market. 
 
3.2 Derivatives 
	  
Derivatives play a large role in the financial markets. Derivative securities, or derivatives, are 
securities that are determined by (or derived from) the prices of other securities25. The payoffs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, p.384) 
24 (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, p.401) 
25 (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, p.576) 
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depend on the value of other securities, and this makes them powerful tools for both hedging, 
speculation, and reducing transaction costs. When a person or a company enter some sort of 
derivative contract with the intention of reducing risk that they are disposed to, this is referred 
to as hedging26. Speculation is another side of the story, because here the main purpose of 
investing in derivatives is to make profit. Investing in derivatives can sometime provide a 
lower cost way to conduct a particular financial transaction. One of the reasons for this is that 
you construct contracts in forms of “bets” that could provide you a high gain or loss compared 
to the initial cost of making the bet. This could be a way of reducing transaction cost. Even 
though the derivative market is mainly used to hedging purposes, speculation is a necessary 
part of the derivative market. Without it, hedging pressure could create stochastic markets and 
this could disable the risk transfer capacity27. The different risk transfer hypothesis is further 
discussed in section 3.4. 
A participant in the derivative market is said to have a long position if he/she or it buys a 
security (commodity, stock, currency) with the intention of selling it in the future to gain from 
a possible price increase. The opposite story is called short-sale. If a participant of the market 
expects that the security price will fall, he/she or it can borrow the security from an owner, 
sell it, receive the cash, and when the prices fall, buy the security back and return it back to 
the lender. Put in a simpler way, selling something you do not own is referred to as short-sale. 
There are many reasons to use derivatives, and it seems to have an increasingly important role 
in today’s volatile financial markets. In general, derivatives provide an alternative to a simple 
sale or purchase, and this increase the investment possibilities in the market. However, 
because of the high level of uncertainty in some markets, hedging may be more desirable than 
arbitrage opportunities in the market. McDonald (2013) defines three distinctive perspectives 
on derivatives: the end-user perspective, the market-maker perspective and the economic 
observer. The end-users is defined as the corporations, investment managers and other 
investors that enter into derivative contracts to manage risk, speculate, reduce costs, or avoid 
some sort of regulation or rule. An end-user care about how a derivative contract can help 
achieve some sort of goal he/she/it may have. The market-makers are the intermediaries. They 
are traders that buy derivatives from customers that want to sell, and sell to the customers that 
want to buy. The way to do this is to make a spread, you buy at a low price and when the 
price is high, you sell. The activity of an economic observer is to look at the use of the 
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27 (Berg, 2011, p.269) 
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derivatives, the activities of the market-makers, the organizations and the logic pricing models 
and to try to make sense of it all. This is to consider actions such as regulation of certain 
activities and how to construct such regulations. 
Futures contracts are a type of derivative product. A future contract is a contract between two 
parties that carries out the obligation to buy or sell an asset for a price determined today with 
delivery and payment at a future point, the delivery date28. Futures markets have their roots in 
commodities and agricultural products, but there also exists financial futures such as those 
based on stocks indexes and government bonds. Hedging and speculation are typical 
intensives to use futures contracts. There are different theories regarding the price dynamics 
of these futures contracts, and to give a perception of the dynamics, some of these theories are 
described in the following sections. 
 
3.3 Spot-futures parity theorem 
	  
Futures contract can be used to hedge against changes in the value of any underlying asset. 
For example, a firm planning to sell oil might be exposed to periods of high market volatility 
and in order to protect against this the firm can use futures contracts. To do this the oil firm 
engage in a “short-hedge”, taking a short futures position to hedge against risk in the sales 
price. A “long-hedge” refers to a position where someone wants to eliminate the risk of an 
uncertain purchase price. Using the oil example again, this applies to a power supplier that 
buys oil and needs to hedge against the potential risk of high oil prices. In the futures market, 
the convergence property implies that FT – PT = 0. This means that on the maturity date of a 
contract, the basis risk between the futures price and the spot price is equal to zero29. The 
futures market convergence is the process were futures market and spot market prices come 
together (converge) at the futures market expiration30. Convergence occurs at every futures 
contract expiration because of arbitrage. If the spot prices are lower than the futures prices, a 
market participant could by in the spot market and sell in the futures market, thus making a 
risk-free profit. The same holds in the opposite case, when the spot price is above the futures 
price, a market participant could buy in the futures market, take delivery and sell in the spot 
market, thus earning a risk-free profit. However, if a futures contract is liquidated before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, p.664)	  
29 (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, p.677) 
30 (Seamon, 2010, p.2) 
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maturity, the hedger bears basis risk, because the spot- and futures price has not converged 
yet. Because of this convergence property, a portfolio containing both assets and futures has 
no risk, and the hedged position provides a rate of return equal to other risk-free investments. 
If this is not the case, arbitrage opportunities will be exploited until the prices are brought 
back into line. This is the main insight of the spot-futures parity theorem. The theorem 
provides the theoretically correct relationship between futures and spot prices. It states that a 
total investment of a current stock price (S0) grows to a final value of F0 + D, where D is the 
dividend payout of the portfolio.  According to the theorem, the futures price must be31:  
                                                           F0 = S0(1 + rf – d)                                                     (3.3.1) 
where d is the dividend yield on a stock portfolio, S0 is the current stock price and rf is the 
risk-free rate. Because of this, the rate of return of a perfectly hedged stock portfolio is 
essentially riskless. 
 
3.4 Expectation-, Normal Backwardation- and Contango Hypothesis 
	  
Theories of futures pricing in this subsection are all based on Keynes way of defining the 
nature of risk and returns. Keynes (1930) proposed that the speculative participants of the 
commodity futures market earn a risk premium as their reward for absorbing the hedger’s 
risk32. The theories is referred to as the risk transfer hypothesis, and it is assumed that the 
hedgers are net short, and speculators net long33. 
The expectation hypothesis is considered as one of the simplest theories of futures pricing. 
The hypothesis states that the futures price is an unbiased estimate of the expected future spot 
price of the asset34: F0 = E(PT). The hypothesis relies on the assumption of risk neutrality, 
because if all investors are risk neutral, they should be able to agree on a futures price that 
provides an expected profit of zero to all participants. The market is assumed to be efficient, 
and this result in a market with no uncertainty and all the prices are currently known and 
available. Because of this, the futures price will be equal the currently known future spot price 
for any given maturity. This theory ignores the fact that spot prices can be uncertain, thus 
ignores the risk premium that should be added to the futures prices.  
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The theory of normal backwardation derives from the assumption that for most commodities 
there are natural hedgers who wishes to shred risk35. For example a farmer that wants to hedge 
against the risk of uncertain wheat prices. This could be done by taking short positions to 
deliver wheat in the future at a settled future price, thus short-hedging the risk. Speculators 
could enter the long side of these contracts if the futures price is below the expected spot price 
of wheat, thus getting an expected profit of E(PT) – F0. This is the farmers expected loss that 
this individual is willing to bear in order to protect against potential losses due to uncertain 
wheat prices. According to Bodie, Kane & Marcus (2011) “the theory of normal 
backwardation thus suggest that the futures price will be bid down to a level below the 
expected spot price and will rise over the life of the contract until the maturity date, at which 
point FT = PT” (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2011, p.686). This theory includes risk premiums in 
the futures market, but it is based on variabilities rather than on systematic risk. This could 
result in an inappropriate risk premium. 
The Contango hypothesis deals with the opposite situation where the natural hedgers are the 
purchasers of a commodity, rather than the suppliers. It states that the purchasers are willing 
to pay a premium to lock down the price that they must pay for the commodity. The 
purchasers hedge by taking a long position in the futures market, in other words, they are 
long-hedgers and the buyer are short-hedgers. The long-hedgers will agree to pay high futures 
prices to avoid risk, and the speculators must be paid a premium to enter the opposite (short) 
position, the Contango theory states that F0 must exceed E(PT)36. The basic movements of the 
three theories are shown in figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Futures prices over time when the expected spot price remains unchanged. 
All these traditional hypotheses have been widely criticized, and the main criticism is that it 
seems to be far away from what is observed in the real world. One of the reasons for this is 
that it is in a way assumed that all participants in the market live in a static world with typical 
transactions and predictable behaviors37. The situation in the real world is not very predictable 
and it consists of high fluctuation and shocks that is hard (if not impossible) to predict. It is 
also the case that in real world, not all participants have the same access to full information, 
so their expectations are often based on different criteria, which again challenges the efficient 
market hypothesis.  
The question is, could this uncertainty push up the prices of the futures contracts, and will this 
price increase affect the spot prices of the underlying assets as well? It is clear that speculative 
activity is an important factor that contributes to the price convergence in time, but what if the 
proportion of these participants surpasses the participants that needs to reduce risk? This is 
what seem to happen in today’s commodity markets, and some researchers claim that this 
increases the volatility of the returns, thus affecting the hedgers that need to use these 
contracts to hedge against potential risk factors they are facing. Increased prices due to 
increased volatility could give these participants huge negative consequences such as not 
being able to enter these contracts simply because they cannot afford it. These observations 
and statements should encourage institutional parties to investigate the possible linkage 
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between the increasing speculative activities and the higher futures and food prices observed 
in the market.  
 
4. Price dynamics of global agricultural commodities 
	  
The agricultural commodity prices have suffered from huge fluctuations in the recent years, 
affecting many people in the world. The price of maize raised as much as 93 per cent in the 
United States (not inflation adjusted) from 2009-2012 (figure 4.1). In the same period the 
price of soybeans increased by 50 per cent and the price of wheat increased by around 60 per 
cent38 (figure 4.2). There exist similar patterns for the commodities in other parts of the world 
as well. There are several factors that have contributed to the increase in the commodity 
prices, some reflects trends of slower growth in production and some reflects the rapid growth 
in demand. Figure 4.3 shows a monthly price index for food commodities that are considered 
as the basis for human consumption of staple foods. The prices seems to have been stable in 
the period from 1990-2006 with some short periods where the prices rose from the previous 
year. In 1996, the prices reached a high peak compared to the previous years, but in 1997, it 
quickly declined to its previous level. After this the prices were stable in the following years, 
but in 2005 the prices slowly started to rise again, and in 2007-2008 the prices increased 
drastically, and reached an unusual high level compared to the previous years. In fact, the 
prices increased around 25 per cent from 2007-2008, and 58 per cent from 2006-200839. 
Luckily, this huge increase did not last long, and in 2009, the prices decreased again. 
Unfortunately, the price level of 2009 were not to last, the prices started rising again, and in 
2011 the prices reached even higher levels than before. Prices increased as much as 43 per 
cent from 2009-2011. It seems like the prices has declined a bit since 2011, but it has 
maintained high levels compared to the whole period shown in the figure. In the recent year, 
there has been some declining tendency, and the current prices are similar to the levels of 
2009. Why do these spikes and fluctuations occur? Will the prices suddenly raise again 
reaching new all-time high levels? These types of questions derive from these observed price 
movements, seeing as these movements affect all consumers in the world. This uncertainty 
especially influence people that already spend a huge amount of their income on food, 
because they cannot afford a similar price increases in the future.  
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Figure 4.1 Annual maize and soybean price in United States (retrieved from FAOSTAT). 
 
Figure 4.2 Annual wheat price in the United States (retrieved from FAOSTAT). 
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Figure 4.3. The FAO food price index (measured as monthly change in international prices of the 
average of 5 commodity groups of food commodities, weighted with the average export shares of each 
of the groups). Retrieved from FAOSTAT. 
	  
4.1 Global food crisis 
	  
From the development observed the last decade, it seems that high food prices are the new 
normal. The high prices have forced many disadvantaged families to remove their children 
out of school and to eat cheaper and less nutritious food. This could potentially serve life-long 
effects on the well-being of human beings worldwide40. In fact, these price developments has 
pushed millions of people into the category of “food insecure” and in 2009 the total number 
of undernourished people on the planet topped 1 billion, marking a drastic setback for the UN 
goal of reducing the number of hungry people to 420 million by 201541. According to the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT), the number of 
undernourished people in the world today is around 793 million42. Even though the number 
has decreased compared to the levels of 2009, it is still far away from the goal set by the UN. 
The crisis commenced in 2006 when several of the commodity prices started to rise, and 
many analysts attributed it to be a mixture of factors affecting the demand and supply for 
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food. However, the role of speculation also attracted some of the attention because of the 
indication that the “fundamental” factors did not seem to explain the observed level of 
volatility in the market alone. They questioned whether long-term supply and demand forces 
could lead to the sudden price increases. One reason for this doubt was the observation of the 
futures prices for wheat and the spot price for maize in 2008. According to FAO, the futures 
price of March 2000 for wheat were 60 per cent higher than the expected level derived from 
market fundamentals of supply and demand, and the maize prices in April 2008 were 30 per 
cent beyond their expected underlying value in the same period43. This observation 
highlighted the rapid growth in financial investment in agricultural futures in the U.S. market 
during the years before the crisis.  
 
4.2 General equilibrium theory 
	  
As stated several times before, fundamental supply and demand factors has been claimed to 
be the dominated forces behind the observed food price movements. The purpose of this 
section is to provide an overview of some of the concepts regarding commodity price 
movements. There exist many theories regarding general competitive equilibrium in the 
market of individuals and firms. The main purpose of these theories is to determine under 
which conditions there could be some sort of harmony between the actors in the market. To be 
able to discuss these theories, three fundamental elements of the economy are defined and 
assumed44: 
• Households have given preferences represented by utility functions                                                   
Uh , h = 1,2,……,nh  
• Firms have specific technologies described in production functions                              
Φf , f = 1,2,…..,nf 
• Resource stocks Ri of the commodities i = 1,2,….,n. In addition, it is assumed that 
there exists markets in all commodities and all agents are perfectly informed about 
what is going on in the economy. It is also assumed that the agents usually act like 
price takers in each of the markets. 
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The reason for the approach of trying to find an equilibrium derives from questions such as: 
where do the prices observed in the market come from? Why do people act as price takers? 
What mechanism drives the economy towards an equilibrium? To be able to give a reasonable 
(and general) answer to these questions some further assumptions of the state of the economy 
is assumed45: 
• Information about what is going on in every household and in every firm at a 
particular moment in time are public and available to all agents in the market. Hence 
the competitive allocation in an economy can be described as 
                                                  a = ([x], [q], p) 
 where xh is the utility maximizing consumption bundles for household h = 1,2,….nh, 
and qf is the profit maximizing net output for firm f = 1,2,…,nf at prices p.  
• All goods are purely private goods and joint consumption is not permitted. 
• There are no externalities in the production, thus if q1 is technologically feasible for 
firm 1 and q2 is technologically feasible for firm 2 and the combined net output vector 
q1 + q2 is also feasible.  
These assumptions are very simplified, and it is referred to as the simple aggregation 
property46. If this property holds, the generalized materials balance condition for any 
commodity i is47: 
                                      x𝑖^ℎ!!!!!   ≤  q𝑖^𝑓!!!!!   +  R𝑖^ℎ!!!!! ,                                     (4.2.1) 
or represented in vector form: x ≤ q + R. On the basis of this Cowell (2005) states that “ if an 
allocation is to be feasible, demand cannot exceed supply, where “supply” of any commodity 
covers the aggregate of all net outputs of the firm plus the aggregate of all pre-existing 
stocks” (Cowell, 2005, p.147). From this we get the definition of the competitive equilibrium; 
it is a competitive allocation a*:= ([x*], [q*], p) were the materials balance condition holds. 
This competitive equilibrium is divided into two components, the price-taking maximizing 
behavior of the agents and a feasibility condition incorporated in the generalized material 
balance condition. Together with the assumption that price taking is the representing behavior 
of all rational economic agents in a “core” equilibrium, this could be used to define another 
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useful economic device; the excess demand function for each commodity i. This tool can give 
an indication of where the prices come from.  
4.2.1 The excess-demand approach 
	  
The excess-demand function is said to contain information about the aggregate demand and 
the aggregate supply for a particular good at some given set of market prices. It is defined as a 
function of Ei(.) such that48: 
                                                         Ei(p) := xi(p) – qi(p) - Ri                                            (4.2.2) 
We subtract the net output qi(p) and resource stock Ri of each commodity from the aggregate 
demand function xi(p) for each commodity (given as a function of prices p). According to 
Walras`s law, for any price vector p, the set of n excess demand functions must satisfy49: 
                                                         𝑝𝑖𝐸𝑖 𝐩!!!!  = 0                                                       (4.2.3) 
given that each excess-demand function are homogenous of degree zero and that all agents in 
a private ownership economy are fully informed and rational. In other words, the price of any 
good i is the equilibrium price if the value of the excess demand function is equal to zero. 
This relationship between the market demand from consumers, resource stocks, net output 
from the firms and excess demand for any commodity i, give rise to the conditions for the 
equilibrium price in terms of the excess demand function: 
                                                                Ei(p*) ≤ 0,                                                           (4.2.4) 
                                                                  p*i  ≥ 0,                                                             (4.2.5) 
                                                             p*i  Ei(p*) = 0                                                        (4.2.6) 
From this, it is claimed that in equilibrium there cannot be excess demand, and for any good 
that there exist excess supply, this must be a free good50. Because of these properties of the 
excess demand functions, it is possible to find En if you know E1,…,En-1 from the following 
formula51: 
                                                    En(p) = - 
!!"    𝑝𝑖𝐸𝑖 𝐩!!!!!!                                        (4.2.7) 
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Because of the restrictions in (4.2.4-6), it is possible to find the equilibrium price vector in 
any economy were there are n commodities, n prices and n excess demands. Although this 
sounds trivial, it contains some issues regarding the existence-, the uniqueness and the 
stability of the possible equilibrium. There exists conditions that eliminates these issues, but I 
will present these in detail in this thesis. It is not always the case that there exist an 
equilibrium price vector p*, given a set of some specific excess demand functions E such that 
the conditions of the equilibrium prices holds. If an excess demand function contains “holes” 
it may jump from positive to negative without ever being zero, and the price will never reach 
equilibrium52. Another issue regarding the excess demand functions is that they could consist 
of functions that provides several equilibriums because of several turning points around zero. 
There exists conditions that eliminates these issues, but I will present these in detail in this 
thesis. However, some of the weaknesses of the approach is mentioned below. 
The excess-demand approach described above provides a general overview of which factors 
and behaviors that could provide a general competitive equilibrium in the economy. It 
provides a tool for all agents in the market for analyzing the properties of the equilibrium 
price vectors. The approach holds all the information about the price taking responses by 
aggregating the relationship between the demand and supply functions over all agents. The 
system will yield a unique equilibrium price vector p* under given reasonable conditions 
discussed in this section. Although excess demand functions are helpful tools for getting 
results, some weaknesses should be mentioned. The assumption of continuity may be 
demanding. In reality, it is not always the case that we have continuity in the excess demand 
functions, and if we assume that these functions are continuous, the approach could provide 
an inaccurate picture of how the factors in the economy actually work. Another problem with 
the theory is the normalization of the prices. Even though normalized prices do provide nice 
properties such as convex and compact prices, non-convex properties may exist in the real 
world. This could also provide an absence of equilibrium in the excess demand functions 
because of discontinuity in the function. Even though there exists some deficiencies in this 
theoretical approach, the theory is widely used and in fact, most macroeconomic models are 
general-equilibrium models as well53. 
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4.3 Macroeconomic factors 
	  
As mentioned in section 4.1, there are several factors that could affect the agricultural 
commodities price dynamics, and in section 4.2 the fundamental factors of general 
equilibrium prices were discussed. There are many assumptions and properties involved in 
such a theoretical approach, and often these do not reflect a realistic view of the reality. In 
fact, all citizens in the world would live in perfect harmony, and the prices would always 
reflect the “correct” price given by the demand and supply in the market. Even though the 
prices would differentiate from the equilibrium level in some periods, it will always move 
towards the equilibrium price again because of the stability condition given in the theory. 
According to the recent observations, this does not always seem to be the case, and this gives 
rise to the current discussion of other possible factors that could be affecting the price 
processes. In this section, there will be presented some concrete macroeconomic factors that 
possibly could affect the commodity price processes supported by the existing literature of the 
phenomenon.   
It is definitely not an easy task to identify all the potential causes of the price movements 
observed in recent years. One of the reasons for this could be that it is not always easy to 
differentiate the factors affecting the prices as endogenous or exogenous causes. If 
endogenous factor are creating price spikes, this cannot be considered as a primary driver54. 
The reason for this is that endogenous variables are claimed to be affected by individual’s 
internal responses to an external state of affairs55. The exogenous variables are said to have 
some sort of value given by nature, hence it cannot be affected by any theorist’s variable of 
interest. Because of this conflict of determining which factors that could be considered as 
possible valid drivers of agricultural food prices, Braun and Tadesse (2012) differentiates 
possible food price drivers as root, intermediate and immediate causes. The result is provided 
in table 4.1. 
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Root causes Intermediate causes Immediate causes Effects 
Extreme weather 
events 
Concentrations of 
world food 
production in some 
areas. Few exporters. 
Lack of information 
on world food. 
Export restrictions 
Aggressive food 
imports. 
 
 
Increase in prices 
 
 
 
Volatility 
 
 
Spikes 
Increasing biofuel 
demand 
Economic growth in 
emerging markets 
Decline in world 
food reserves 
Increasing volume 
of futures trading 
in commodity 
markets 
 
 
Table 4.1 Possible Food Price Drivers 
The basis for Braun and Tadesse (2012) division of possible food drivers is the empirical and 
theoretical research done on the phenomenon that suggests that climate change from the 
supply side, biofuel production from the demand side and speculation in commodity futures 
from the market side are the three most important root causes of the observed price spikes and 
volatility. Even though the total grain production has not shown any significant change over 
the past 10 years, it continues to be volatile and less predictable as a result of extreme weather 
conditions in some part of the world. One example of this is the drastic drought in Ukraine 
and Russia that occurred in 201056. This event reduced the wheat supplies in that period. 
Another example is the drought in southern China that resulted into small food storages and 
this forced the country to turn to large scale imports. Flooding events is another factor that has 
devastated millions of wheat and rice fields, thereby contributed to pushing up the global food 
price.  
Another factor that is considered to affect the prices of certain commodities is the demand for 
biofuel feedstock. The cause for this increased demand has its roots in the increased oil price 
and biofuel mandates in European Union, the United States, and other developing countries57. 
Agricultural resources such as land and labor are being used to produce this biofuel feedstock. 
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In fact, as much as a third of the U.S. corn yields have been allocated to the production of 
ethanol, and it continues to grow58. Actually, corn used for ethanol rose from around 1 million 
bushels in 2002/2003 to around 3.1 billion bushels in the crop year of 2007/200859. If this 
growth exaggerates, this could increase the price of biofuel feedstock such as maize, corn and 
oilseeds. Non-biofuel feedstock crops such as wheat could also be affected because of the 
resource allocation and substitution observed in the field.  The increase in the crop prices 
derived from biofuel feedstock could potentially contribute to world starvation (especially in 
developing countries), and at the same time it could accelerate the climate change present in 
the world. Other demand-factors that could affect the commodity prices are high energy costs, 
decelerated productivity growth in agriculture, trade policies, and population growth60. 
The factors that could affect the commodity prices discussed so far derives from fundamental 
supply/ demand factors. As mentioned before, many researchers claim that the price 
movements of the commodity prices are due to these fundamental factors, and there exists a 
lot of academic research supporting this linkage. However, the resent price spikes have 
opened a debate of whether other factors, such as speculation in the derivative market, could 
affect the commodity prices as well. The reason for this is the observed increase in the volume 
of futures traded (alongside with the other features of the market mentioned above) in the 
commodity market. Speculation in the commodity markets is considered to be conceptually 
and empirically ambiguous, and there exist little evidence that speculation drives commodity 
prices beyond fundamental levels61. However, there are some researchers that claims to have 
provided evidence of this linkage, hence it should not immediately be rejected as a possible 
influencing factor. 
 
4.4 The effect of speculation 
	  
As mentioned in section 4.1 and 4.3, speculation has received many researchers attention 
when trying to explain the observed price movements of several commodities in the 
commodity market in recent years. However, agricultural commodities have always in a way 
been volatile because of the risk of possible events such as natural disasters (shocks) are 
always present. This makes the prices very vulnerable and difficult to predict, but in the recent 
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years, the slopes in the price changes are so steep and the peaks so high that there seems to be 
an extraordinary phenomenon in the commodity markets. This has motivated researchers to 
take a closer look on the linkage between speculation and price changes. To further 
investigate the price changes, Braun and Tadesse (2012) distinguishes the different terms used 
when referring to price changes: price movements can be descried as spikes, trends or 
volatility. They state that “a price trend is the smooth, long-term average movement of prices 
over time; it shows the general tendency of prices for a certain period of time” (Braun & 
Tadesse, 2012, p.3). A price spike “refers to a change in price levels over a shorter period of 
time, usually between two consecutive observations” (Braun & Tadesse, 2012, p.3), and 
volatility is defined as “the dispersion of a price series from a mean” (Braun & Tadesse, 2012, 
p.3). The volatility is said to measure the risk of the prices, it does not measure any direction 
(trend) of the price changes. Volatility can further be divided into high-frequency and low-
frequency volatility, high-frequency volatility refers to natural shocks that last for a season or 
less, and low-frequency volatility refers to variability that persist for more than one season62. 
High short-term spikes in the commodity prices are often related to high-frequency volatility, 
and this type of risk is possible to manage by providing insurance to protect against potential 
losses deriving from such a shock. Low-frequency volatility is more difficult to manage, and 
it is important to figure out which effects this volatility has on both consumers and producers. 
Price volatility affect both consumers and producers, and risk-averse agent`s will be affected 
because of the risk introduced by the volatility. The question is what causes high volatility?  
Volatility can derive from fundamental factors such as supply and demand factors, but market 
manipulation and even high prices itself can create periods with high volatility. The 
relationship between an increase in prices and an increase in the volatility is not well defined 
in the literature, but the high price levels observed in 2008 and 2011 have been linked to high 
price volatility. One of the reasons for this is that it seems to be a tendency of volatility 
clustering in the prices, figure 4.4 shows the price changes in the prices of wheat, maize and 
soybeans in U.S the last 15 years.  
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Figure 4.4 Weekly spot price changes in the price of wheat, maize and soybean in the U.S (retrieved 
from the U.S Department of Agriculture). Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
In these figures, it is clear that there are some periods were there are many large positive and 
large negative changes. This can indicate that the current level for volatility depends on the 
volatility level derived from the immediately preceding period. In other words it looks like the 
volatility of the price process occurs in bursts. In the wheat price case this is specially 
observed in the period from 2006-2009, but there seems to be some tendency also after 2010. 
In the period before 2006, this market seemed to be relatively tranquil. Similar patterns are 
observed in the prices of maize and soybeans; maize has huge weekly fluctuations, especially 
in the period of 2007-2013. The price of soybeans seems to have some tendency of volatility 
clustering some time before 2006 as well, but the size of the changes increases a lot in the 
later years, especially from 2008-2013. In the same period of these observations there have 
been some significant changes in the agriculture commodity market as well. Figure 4.5 shows 
the changes in the settlement prices, volume traded and open interest of wheat futures on the 
CBOT exchange. 
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Figure 4.5 Weekly changes in wheat futures trading volume, open interest and settlement price 
(retrieved from CBOT and the U.S Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)). Source: 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
The open interest, trading volume- and settlement price processes of the wheat futures seems 
to contain some tendency of volatility clustering, especially from around 2008 to current time. 
The amount of futures contracts traded has increased a lot in this period as well. Could there 
be a linkage between these aspects of the markets? This is the fundamental motivation for the 
empirical work, and the linkage is tested in section 8.  
 
5 Deregulation of the commodity market in U.S 
	  
Trading of agricultural derivatives are definitely not a new phenomenon, but there exists some 
major differences in the futures market today compared to earlier years. Historically, starting 
with the Grain Futures Act of 1922, the U.S agriculture futures market was highly regulated63. 
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There were established position limits on traders (speculators) that were not hedgers to 
prevent market manipulation and exaggeration that could create chaotic situations for farmers, 
food producers and consumers. The purpose of these regulations was never to prevent 
speculation, because the price discovery function of speculation has long been recognized. 
The objective of the Act in 1936 speaks of “eliminating “excessive speculation” that causes 
sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in commodity prices” (Clapp & 
Helleiner, 2010, p.186). This shows that the discussion of the possibility that exaggerate 
speculation in commodity markets could affect the spot prices have long been recognized, and 
therefore there has been regulations in the market to avoid this. So what have been the 
incentives of the de-regulative activities observed in the commodity market the last decades? 
Who are the winners and who are the losers of these deregulatory events?  
	  
5.1 Development of the U.S Commodity markets 
	  
In 1972, financial futures were introduced and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange launched 
several currency futures contracts to enable trade between the United States Dollar foreign 
currencies including British Pound, Deutsche Mark and Swiss Franc64. Other exchange traded 
financial futures started to rise and because of this innovation, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) was born in 197465. The American congress at that time gave 
the CFTC the authority to approve positions limits and to define the specifications of all 
futures contracts listed on United States exchanges to make sure that any form of market 
manipulation were avoided66. (This fits well with the objectives of the Act from 1936). 
However, in the beginning of the 1980s, the first important deregulatory initiative related to 
the activities in the derivative market emerged: over-the-counter (OTC) swaps67. These swaps 
were offered to clients that were seeking exposure to commodity price movements, or clients 
that wanted to balance their investment portfolios. However, this was not all that the OTC 
swaps offered. The swaps also offered clients the opportunity to invest with the main purpose 
to speculate in the commodity price movements, and from the early 1990s, banks also started 
to sell swaps based on indices of commodity prices (including agricultural commodities)68. 
The reason that these contracts indicated a shift in the commodity markets was that the OTC 
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contracts were (and is currently) not traded on formal exchanges, thus they are not subject to 
any regulations. Already in the middle of the 1990s, the OTC swap market was in full swing, 
topping 10 trillion in notional amounts of outstanding contracts69. Even though there were 
periodic initiatives to extend the CFTC`s regulatory reach to the OTC derivatives market in 
both the 1980s and the 1990s, this was wildly resisted by the financial industry and the free-
market oriented policymakers70. Under pressure from these groups together with the pressure 
from other powerful organizations like the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA)71, the U.S congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act in 2000 which 
according to Clapp and Helleiner (2010) “explicitly prevented the CFTC from regulating 
OTC derivatives” (Clapp & Helleiner, 2010, p.187). This Act removed essential safeguards 
that had protected the agricultural derivatives from misuse in many decades. According to a 
report provided by Oxfam International in 2011, Wallace Darneille, the chief executive of the 
Plains Cotton Cooperative Association quoted in the New York times that “the market is 
broken … It no longer serves its purpose” ( Herman, Kelly, & Nash, 2011, p.4).  
In the beginning of this section there were questioned why these deregulatory events observed 
in the last decades has emerged. From an investors point of view, the deregulation were 
highly preferable because investment in financial instruments tied to commodity prices 
appeared to give more lucrative and stable returns compared to stocks. In fact, investments 
linked to commodity prices could also provide protection against inflation, and when the 
subprime mortgage crisis broke out in 2007, investment in commodities raised further since 
the commodity markets seemed to offer some protection against financial instability72. At the 
same time that all these different events occurred, the spot prices of the underlying 
commodities increased rapidly as shown in section 4.1. As mentioned several times before, it 
is hard to provide empirical evidence of a linkage between these observations, but there seems 
to be some sort of “unwillingness” to actually trying to figure this out, especially seen from 
the financial institutions point of view. But who can blame them for this? Berg (2011) claims 
that “the commodity index retail fund might be viewed as one of the most ingenious 
innovations ever sold” (Berg, 2011, p.267). The reason for this is that these financial products 
oblige the customer to pay a 100 per cent deposit to purchase a basket of commodity futures. 
Because of this, the customer cover 100 per cent of the potential losses derived from events 
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such as declining commodity prices, and if the commodity price increases, the customer must 
share the profits with the sales firm. This actually makes the sales firms in a way immune to 
possible counterparties or default risk. This implies that the true winners of the deregulations 
observed in the commodity markets are banks and funds that cashes in huge profits from this 
new asset class.  
It is reasonable to imagine that in a situation where there exists winners, there also exists 
losers. Who are the potential losers of this “game”? In section 4.1 there was provided some 
explanations of how the high food prices observed in the recent years affect the world’s 
poorest population, but the “rule of the game” may also affect other participants in the market. 
Food producers (especially in developing countries) may also be influenced of this increased 
speculative trading in the commodity markets73. If a food producer wants to protect herself 
from a particular risky event, she might want to hedge against the risk that she is disposed too. 
This could be done by buying a suitable derivative product from a financial broker in return of 
a fixed premium. However, if the prices are too unstable and the premium to high, she may 
not be able to provide enough cash up front because it is simply too expensive for her. This 
should give the supervisory institutions motivation and incentives to further investigate this 
phenomenon in order to consider new regulations to provide such situations to occur. 
 
5.2 Financialization of the commodity market 
	  
The steep rise of institutional inflows from financial parties into the commodity market 
explained in section 5.1 gives rise to the term “financialization of commodity markets”74. The 
increased speculative activity in the commodity market have made these markets more like 
financial markets in terms of motivations and participants, and this has led to a definition of 
this phenomenon. Financialization can be defined as the “increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic 
and international economics”75 (Fuchs, Hamenstadt, & Meyer-Eppler, 2013, p.221). The 
problem with financialization of agricultural derivatives is that they are no longer working as 
initially intended76. Some would say that the intention of agricultural derivatives is to help 
food producers, processors and other end users to deal with plausible risk factors of the 
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physical markets, but as described in section 5.1, this do not seem to reflect what is really 
going on in the markets. From the definitions provided above, financialization could also be 
referred to the increasing speculative activity provided by agents who do not have any interest 
in the physical commodity traded. The main purpose of trading seems to be to place bets on 
their future prices in order to profit from their price movements. According to the risk transfer 
hypothesis described in section 3.4, the efficient price that speculation helps to find should 
accurately reflect the market situation. However, this does not seem to be the case when 
looking at the commodity spot prices in the last decades. In fact, the UNCTAD study finds 
that in the recent years, the commodity spot prices has not reflected the real world situation77. 
This type of observations has given rise to several economic studies related to the 
phenomenon. Many of these studies focus on the restricted form of financilization, which 
produces changes in correlations and rises in open interest and trading volume, but whether 
these increases is due to speculative behavior is still unclear78. However, the fact that the 
financialization of the commodity markets observed in the recent years is due to the 
deregulatory and market pressures seems to have some consensus among the researchers in 
this field. The consequences of the financialization in the commodity markets is another story, 
here there exists many different suggestions, and this has been a part of the main motivations 
for the empirical work of this thesis. 
 
6 Testing procedure 
	  
To test whether speculation in the commodity markets affect the underlying commodity spot 
price, I used the statistical software STATA. The model used to study the phenomenon is a 
general autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model. The parameters of the 
model are estimated using a maximum likelihood function. Given the estimates from the 
model, there will be performed parametric tests to check their significance. The result of the 
model is only valid if the underlying assumption of the model holds. The residual of the 
model has to be normally distributed and it should not be serial-correlated. The Akaike`s 
information criteria (AIC) was used to identify the proper process of the mean equation of the 
model. In order to use a GARCH model there should be ARCH-effects in the residuals 
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derived from the mean equation of the model, meaning that the variance of the current error 
term is related to the size of the previous period error term.   
 
6.1 The auto-correlation function (ACF) 
	  
One of the assumptions of the model is that there should not exist any serial-correlation in the 
residuals derived from the model. If the volatility clustering observed in the wheat price series 
is properly explained by the model, then there should not be autocorrelation in the residuals. 
An auto-correlation function (acf) could be derived from a given stochastic process and this 
could provide important properties of the process. This can also be helpful when trying to 
identify the data generating process. The correlation between two elements of a stochastic 
process separated by lag k is defined as79: 
                                                     𝜏! = [ !!!!! !!!!!!! ]! !!!!! ! ![ !!!!!!! !]                                  (6.1.1) 
For a stationary process (E[𝑋!] = 0 and V[𝑋!] = 𝜎!) the expression (6.1.1) reduces to: 
                                                      𝜏!= !(!!,!!!!)!!                                             (6.1.2) 
If 𝜏! is plotted against k = 0,1,…, T-1, the auto-correlation function is obtained. The values of 𝜏! lie in the interval (-1,1), and the estimate plot of the acf could be a helpful tool when trying 
to identify a stochastic process which could serve as a model for the underlying process. If for 
a given k the estimate 𝜏!lie outside the Bartlett band: 
−    𝑧! − 𝛼2 1𝑇 ;+ 𝑧! − 𝛼2 1𝑇  
Then we can reject the null hypothesis. The null- and alternative hypothesis of the test are: 
                                                 H0: τk = 0                H1: τk ≠ 0 
If we are able to reject the null hypothesis, there should exist a proper stochastic process that 
could serve as a model for the underlying process.  
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6.2 Test for Serial-Correlation 
	  
Another way of testing for autocorrelation in the residuals is by using a Ljung-Box test. The 
test is designed to test the joint hypothesis that all m of the τk correlation coefficients are 
simultaneously equal to zero using the modified Q-statistics known as the Ljung-Box statistic 
(1978)80: 
                                                    Q = T(T + 2)
!!!!!!!!!!  ~ 𝜒!!                                      (6.2.1) 
The null- and alternative hypothesis of the test are: 
                                                 H0: τk = 0                      H1: τk ≠ 0 
Under the null hypothesis, we want to test if all m autocorrelation coefficients are zero. If the 
p-value < 0.05 (5% significance level) and Q ≥ ω1-α we can reject H0 (with ω1-α denoting the 
relevant percentage level). If we fail to reject HO, then there exists no autocorrelation in the 
residuals of the model. In order to use this hypothesis test, the residuals derived from the 
model has to be normally distributed. This assumption makes it possible to assume that the 
sample autocorrelation coefficients are close to normally distributed:  
                                                     𝜏! ~ approx.. N(0, !!) 
Where T represents the sample size and 𝜏! represents the autocorrelation coefficient at lag s 
estimated from the sample. This is required in order to conduct significance tests.   
 
6.3 Test for Normality 
	  
There exists many ways of determining if we have normality in the residuals or in the sample 
data itself. One possibility is to check the skewness and kurtosis of the data. These factors 
represent the third and fourth moment of the specific distribution we are dealing with81. 
Brooks (2008) state that “skewness measures the extent to which a distribution is not 
symmetric about its mean value and kurtosis measures how fat the tails of the distributions 
are” (Brooks, 2008, p.161). A normal distribution is not skewed and it contains a kurtosis 
coefficient of 3.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 (Brooks, 2008, p.210) 
81 (Brooks, 2008, p.161) 
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There are other more formal tests to test for normality such as the Shapiro-Wilk test. Shapiro 
and Wilk (1965) proposed a test that tests whether a random sample comes from a normal 
distribution. The test statistics is82: 
                                                         W = 
( !!!(!))!!!! !(!!!!)!!!! !                                                       (6.3.1) 
where x(i) are the ordered sample values and ai are constants generated from the mean, 
variance and covariance of the order statistics, and n is the sample size. The test statistics can 
be presented as: 
                                              H0: x ~ N(0,σ2)      H1: x ≁ N(0, σ2) 
were the null hypothesis states that the sample data is normally distributed. The null 
hypothesis can be rejected if the p-value is less than the chosen alpha level (p-value < 
α(0.01,0.05,0.1).)  
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6.4 Test for Stationarity 
	  
It is not always easy to conclude that a particular process is stationary just by looking at the 
autocorrelation plot, especially if we are dealing with a random walk process. The acf of such 
a process will often not show a very persistent decay toward zero, this can result in false 
conclusions of the underlying process if we don’t use other stationary tests as well. If a non-
stationary series must be differenced d times to become stationary, then it is said that it is 
integrated of order d83. When a series is differenced once this may have removed one of the 
unit roots, but there may still exist a unit root in the new differenced variable. So to be sure 
that a process is stationary there could be performed an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, 
which is a testing procedure that test whether a series is characterized by a unit root or not. 
Dickey and Fuller (1976 & 1979) develop the test, and the objective of the test is to examine 
the null hypothesis that ⱷ=1 in: 
                                                                   yt = ⱷyt-1 + ut                                                                            (6.4.1) 
against ⱷ < 184, where ut is a white noise disturbance term with E(ut) = 0 and V(ut) = σ2. 
The test-hypothesis is: 
                                HO: series contains a unit root       H1: series are stationary 
The test can also be written as:  
                                                      ∆yt = Ψyt-1 + 𝛼𝑖  ∆!!!!  yt-1 + ut ,                         (6.4.2) 
and the test statistics is Ψ/SE(Ψ). Reject HO if p < α(0,01/0,05/0,10) and Z < (-3.43,-2.86,-2.57).  
If we fail to reject the null hypothesis, the underlying process contains a unit root, and the 
process is not stationary. 
 
6.5 Model selection 
	  
Another issue with the auto-correlation function is that even though the process is stationary, 
the order of the underlying process needs to be selected. Deciding on the appropriate order 
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84 (Brooks, 2008, p.327) 
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from the ACF could be very difficult. Therefore, to be able to identify the proper order of the 
process we can use an information criterion to decide the model order. The objective of this 
approach is to select the number of parameters which minimizes the value of the information 
criteria. The information criteria used in this thesis is Akaike`s (1974) information criterion 
(AIC). Algebraically, the expression looks like this85: 
                                                                  AIC = ln(𝜎2) + !!!                                      (6.5.1) 
where 𝜎^2 is the residual variance, k= p+q+1 is the total numbers of parameters and T is the 
size of the sample86. The information criteria is minimized subject to p ≤ 𝑝 , q ≤   𝑞 and an 
upper limit is specified on the number of moving average and autoregressive terms that will 
be considered.  
 
6.6 Test for Heteroscedasticity 
	  
To test for heteroscedasticity in the residuals of the mean equation of the model, a test for the 
presence of ARCH-effect is used. The estimated residuals 𝜀! form the mean equation is 
obtained as well as their squares 𝜀!!. To test for first order ARCH, a regression of 𝜀!! on the 
squared residuals lagged 𝜀!!!!  is performed87:  
                                                         𝜀!! = β0 + β1 𝜀!!!!  + vt                                                  (6.6.1) 
where vt ~  N(0,1). The null and alternative hypotheses are: 
                                          HO: β0 = 0                 H1: β0 ≠ 0 
If β0 = 0 then there are no ARCH effects. The test statistics is (T-q)R2  were T is the sample 
size, q is the number of 𝜀!!!!  on the right hand side of the regression equation, and R2 is the 
coefficient of determination. If (T-q)R2 ≥ χ2(1-α,q) then we can reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that there are ARCH effects present in the residuals. 
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7 Data 
	  
I used Wheat No.2, Soft Red Cts/Bu from U.S Department of Agriculture to measure the price 
movements. The commodity is quoted in US cents per bushel. To measure the effect of 
speculation I used wheat futures contracts from the Chicago Board of trade (CBOT) 
exchange. Data on open interest and trading volume were collected from the Thomson 
Reuters Datastream88. Information on closing open interest can also be found in the weekly 
Commitment of Traders (COT) report issued by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC)89. In this report the outstanding futures contracts are split into commercial and non-
commercial traders, as well as reportable and non-reportable traders. I have used this report to 
collect data on the non-commercial trading activity90. A trading activity is classified as 
commercial if the trader uses future contracts in that particular commodity for hedging 
purposes91 .  Non-commercial traders just hold positions in futures contracts, but they do not 
own the underlying asset. Another way of describing non-commercial traders is that they do 
not invest in futures contracts with the purpose of reducing risk; they only want to make a 
profit. The non-reportable positions are the number of traders left after subtracting total long 
and short “reportable positions” from the total open interest. According to CFTC`s 
explanatory notes (2015), the reportable traders are clearing members, futures commission 
merchants and foreign brokers92. Unfortunately, the commercial/non-commercial 
classification of traders involved in the non-reportable positions is unknown. This could make 
the measure of the noncommercial participant a bit inaccurate. In the empirical analysis, I 
used volume of contracts traded, the open interest and the non-commercial open interest 
positions as a proxy for speculative behavior. These factors can be defined as outside shocks 
of the model. Since the dataset from the COT report is weekly compounded, all the other 
datasets has been transformed into weekly returns. The COT report is widely used in 
academic research, but there exist some shortcomings. The data provided are weekly 
compounded which can result in a high degree of aggregation, and the trader classifications 
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89 (Bohl & Stephan, 2013, p.600) 
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could not be as accurate as we want it to be. It is important to keep this in mind before 
drawing any conclusions.  
 
7.1 Characteristics of the wheat market 
	  
Figure 7.1 displays the price movements of wheat in the last 15 years. Here we can see that 
the price has been quite stable from 2000-2006, but around 2006 it started to get abnormally 
high compared to levels observed in previous periods. This abnormal increase did not seem to 
stop and around 2007-2008 the price rose drastically, followed by a dramatically decrease at 
the end of 2008. The price increased heavily again from end2009-2011, and the price level 
has been relative high in the period after, but it has decreased a lot this year again. This 
observation could imply that the movement of the wheat price process seems to exhibit 
periods of long swings away from its mean value. This pattern represents the whole period, 
especially the period after 2006. This indicates that the price process of wheat could be a 
random walk process, thus the process seems to be non-stationary. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Figure 7.1 Weekly wheat prices from 2000-2015 (provided by the U.S Department of Agriculture). 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
Figure 7.2 shows the first difference plot of the wheat price, and this differenced process cross 
the mean value very rapidly, thus indicating that the wheat price process is a difference-
stationary process, and the process seems to be at least mean stationary. This transformation 
property could indicate that the wheat price process could be described as a random walk 
process with drift. A more formal description of random walk processes is given in Appendix 
A3. 
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Figure 7.2 First difference plot of the weekly wheat prices. 
However, as described in section 4.4, there seems to be some tendency of volatility clustering 
in the difference plot. This could indicate that the wheat price process is a non-linear process. 
Figure 7.3 shows the histogram of the wheat price process, and there seems to be leptokurtosis 
present in the price changes because of the high peakedness in the mean.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Figure 7.3 Histogram Wheat Price Changes. 
Linear models are not able to explain these important features of the data so it is important to 
recognize whether this process is as a non-linear process or not, and because of the presence 
of volatility clustering and leptokurtosis we are in this case dealing with a non-linear process. 
To make sure that the price changes (measured as first differences) are in fact stationary an 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test will be performed. The test is also applied on the trading 
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volume, open interest and speculative open interest dataset to make sure that we do not use 
non-stationary variables in the main model. Table 7.1 shows the result of the ADF test. The 
test has been performed with different number of lags to be sure that we have an unbiased 
result. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
 
  
Table 7.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results. 
After the wheat price process was differenced once, the process becomes stationary.	   As 
mentioned above there are other features of the differenced process that are present and this 
implies that even though the price process is stationary it looks like the variance of the 
process is not constant and that we have a case of heteroscedasticity. 
Other descriptive statistics is provided in table 7.2, and it contains information regarding all 
the variables that are used in the main model.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 Wheat 
Price 
TV - wheat 
futures 
contracts 
CBOT 
OI - wheat 
futures 
contracts 
CBOT 
SpecOI  
- derived  
from CFTC 
 COT report 
Raw data -2.125 
(0.2242) 
-11.280 
(0.000) 
-1.281 
(0.6377) 
-1.797 
(0.3822) 
Differences -25.018 
(0.000) 
-38.423 
(0.000) 
-21.572 
(0.000) 
-22.028 
(0.000) 
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 Mean Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Shapiro-
Wilk 
Wheat 
Price 
489.1 1150 229.5 187.9 0.51 2.25 0.92076 
(0.000) 
Wheat 
Price first 
difference 
0.4688 125.5 -172.5 26.962 -0.05 7.347 0.94557 
(0.000) 
∆OIt 373.52 61519 -46585 11324.05 -0.128 6.05 0.95441 
(0.000) 
∆TVt 59.22 192435 -129710 31439.76 0.441 9.067 0.90537 
(0.000) 
∆SpecOIt 36.76 10287 -9646 2372.982 0.087 5 0.96920 
(0.000) 
	  
Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics. 
The changes in the futures trading volume, open interest and speculative open interest are also 
measured as weekly differences.	   All the variables has a kurtosis significantly higher than the 
required level of normality. The result of the formal Shapiro-Wilk test for normality is also 
included in the table. All p-values are zero, thus the null hypothesis which states that the data 
is normally distributed is rejected and we have a case of non-normality in the series. This is 
very typical for financial datasets. The most important issue regarding the dataset is to 
determine if the processes are stationary, and as shown above, all the variables above are 
stationary after some transformations were implemented. Using non-stationary data can 
provide undesirable outcomes, and this is further describen in Appendix A2. Non-normality 
does not necessesarily make the parameter estimates less consistent if the mean and variance 
equations of the main model are correctly specified93. However, the usual standard error 
estimates will be inappropriate in the context of non-normality, and therfore a different 
variance-covariance matrix estimator that is robust to non-normality should be used in the 
analysis94. 
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8 Testing speculative effects in the wheat spot price 
	  
In this section, the purpose is to assess whether these price movements observed in the 
commodity markets the two last decades may be related to speculative activity in the futures 
market. I studied the price of wheat during two last decades, with the sample period starting in 
2000 up to 2015.	  The base of this empirical approach is inspired by the paper “ Does Futures 
Speculation Destabilize Spot Prices? New Evidence for Commodity Markets” by Bohl and 
Stephan (2013), and the extension of the conditional volatility equation of the GARCH model 
used in this thesis derive from their research. 
	  
8.1 Methodology 
	  
To analyze the phenomenon I have applied a general autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity GARCH (1, 1) model, and the process of the model is given by95: 
                                                       εt 𝜓t-1 ~ N(0, ht)                                                         (8.1.1) 
                                         ht = α0 α1 𝜀!!!! + β1ht-1 ,      α0  > 0, α1 ≥ 0, β1 ≥ 0                       (8.1.2) 
were εt is a real valued discrete time stochastic process and ψt is the information set of all 
information through time t. According to Bollerslev (1986) the GARCH (1, 1) process is 
“wide-sense stationary with E(εt) = 0, var(εt) = α0(1 – A(1) – B(1))-1 and cov (εt, εs) = 0 for t ≠ 
s if and only if A(1) + B(1) < 1” (Bollerslev, 1986, p.310). This indicates that even though the 
conditional variance is changing, the unconditional variance of εt is constant and given by  
                                                               var(εt) = 
!!!!(  !!  !  !)                                              (8.3.3) 
as long as α1 + β < 1. If this is not the case, the unconditional variance of εt is not defined and 
there would exist non-stationarity in the variance. For a GARCH(1, 1) process there exists a 
necessary condition for the existence of the 2mth moment, and it derives from the fact that 
any GARCH(p, q) process can be interpreted as an autoregressive moving average process in 𝜀!! of orders m = max(Aïd, Ludkovski, & Sircar, 2015) and p96, thus the process can be given 
by: 
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                       𝜀!! =  α0 +   𝛼𝑖  𝜀!!!!!!!!  + 𝛽!  !!!!   𝜀!!!!  −  𝛽!  !!!! 𝑣!!! + vt ,                   (8.3.4) 
and 
                                                            vt = 𝜀!! – ht = ( 𝜂!!- 1 )ht ,                                        (8.3.5) 
where 
                                                                      ηt ~ N(0, 1)  
From the GARCH (1,1) process given by (8.3.1) and (8.3.4) the sufficient condition for the 
existence of the 2mth moment is97: 
                                          µ ( α1, β1, m ) = !!!!!! aj𝛼!!𝛽!!!! < 1 ,                                (8.3.6) 
where 
                                    a0 = 1,        aj = 2𝑗 − 1!!!!  ,         j = 1……                             (8.3.7) 
Given these conditions, the 2mth moment can be expressed by the recursive formula98: 
E(𝜀!!!) = 𝑎! 𝑎!!!!!!!!! E(𝜀!!!)𝛼!!!! !!!! 𝜇(𝛼!,𝛽!,𝑛)   × 1−   𝜇(𝛼!,𝛽!,𝑚 -1          (8.3.8) 
According to Bollerslev (1986) the GARCH(1,1) process is leptokurtic, meaning that it is 
heavily tailed99. 
The parameters of the model are estimated through the maximum likelihood (ML) technique, 
and the log likelihood function for a sample of T observations is (apart from some 
constant)100: 
                                                 L = !! (!!!! − !! log ℎ𝑡 − !! !!!!! )                                      (8.3.9) 
The GARCH model allows the conditional variance to depend upon precious own lags, and 
this makes it possible to interpret the current variance ht (8.1.2) as a function of long term 
average (dependent on α0), information about the volatility during last period (α1 𝜀!!!! ), and 
the fitted variance from the model during the last period (β1ht-1). If α1 > 0 and significant, then 
previous information about the phenomenon under investigation will affect the current 
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volatility of the phenomenon. If β1 > 0 and significant, then previous volatility of the 
phenomenon affect the current volatility of the phenomenon.  
 
8.2 Results 
	  
The purpose of this empirical approach is to assess whether the price movements observed in 
the recent years may be related to speculative activity in the futures market. The wheat price 
changes are modeled as a mixed autoregressive moving average ARMA (1, 1) with GARCH 
error term. 
The conditional volatility equation consists of internal shocks (arch and garch effects) and 
external shocks. Like Bohl and Stephan (2013) the external shocks are aggregate trading 
volume, aggregate open interest and speculative open interest. The GARCH (1,1) model thus 
reads:  
(1)                       rt = C1rt-1 + et + C2et-1      et = vt ℎ𝑡  ,                                                 vt ~ N(0, 1) 
(2)                       ht = C3 + C4e2t-1 + C5h2t-1 + C6∆TVt-1 + C7∆OIt-1 + C8∆SpecOIt-1 
were rt  is the weekly price returns measured as the difference in week t from t-1, and et is the 
unexpected return (error term). The conditional variance equation ht consists of one arch term 
and one garch term, as well as one period lagged change in trading volume (∆TVt-1), open 
interest (∆OIt-1) and the speculative open interest (∆SpecOIt-1). If C6, C7 or C8 are 
statistically significant then there is evidence that changes in these variables may increase the 
conditional volatility of the wheat price, and this could affect the physical price of the 
commodity as well. The model parameters are estimated through the maximum likelihood 
(ML) technique, and the properties of the estimators are given in Appendix A4.  
The price return process of wheat is stationary according to the ADF-test (result given in table 
7.1 above). To test if the assumption of a white noise error term in the ARMA model holds, a 
Q-test were applied. The result of the Q-test is given in table 8.1. 
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Portmanteau test  for white noise 
Portmanteau Q-statistic 45.352 
Prob > chi2(40) 0.2587 
 
Table 8.1 Q-test result of the ARMA(1,1) error-term. 
We fail to reject HO thus the residual derived from the  ARMA(1,1) in is in fact a white noise 
process as acquired. A test for ARCH-effects was also used to make sure that we have a case 
of autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. The result of the test is given in table 8.2. 
 
  Testing for    ARCH effects 
β0  473.927 (0.000) 
β1  0.331 (0.000) 
 
Table 8.2 Result ARCH-effect test of the ARMA(1,1) error-term. 
The null (H0) hypothesis that represent the case of no ARCH effects can be rejected, which 
implies that we have a case of volatility clustering.  Another possible way to describe this is 
that “the volatility is auto-correlated”. 
The result of the GARCH(1,1) model is presented in table 8.3. 
 WHEAT Standard error p-value 
Constant     (C3) 1.79 0.434 0.000 
Residual2       (C4) 0.101 0.018 0.000 
Volatility     (C5) 0.879 0.020 0.000 
∆TV             (C6) 0.0000226 0.00000502 0.000 
∆OI              (C7) -0.0000704 0.0000135 0.000 
∆SpecOI      (C8) 0.0003911 0.000104 0.000 
 
Table 8.3 Result of the GARCH (1,1) model. 
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The results of the main model are derived from a Gaussian distribution and weekly data. The 
Residual2 is the squared residual from the return equation. Volatility is the conditional 
volatility. ∆TV, ∆OI and ∆SpecOI represent the weekly returns given as the weekly changes 
in number of contract in units. All the variables are lagged by one period, and they are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The time span is from October 2000 to January 2015. 
The constant term represent the time-invariant level of conditional volatility101. The squared 
lagged residuals from the return equation and the lagged volatility represent a positive 
influence on the present conditional volatility, given everything else in the model. This means 
that the information about previous week returns do affect the volatility of this week`s return 
and it is statistically significant. The previous week volatility of the returns also affect the 
current volatility of the wheat return and this estimate is also statistically significant. The 
previous period change in aggregate trading volume has a small positive effect on the 
conditional volatility. This means that huge sudden changes in the trading volume may 
influence the current conditional price return volatility. Aggregate changes in the open interest 
have a small negative effect on the conditional volatility. This means that large changes in the 
open interest generally lead to a reduction in the conditional volatility. This is similar to the 
result of Bohl and Stephan (2013). Finally, speculative open interest has a statistically 
significant positive effect on the conditional volatility. This indicates that an increase in the 
speculative participants in the futures market do increase the conditional volatility of the 
wheat price return. 
Figure 8.1 show the conditional variance of the model. From this plot it is clear that the 
degree of price fluctuations is not constant over time. There are periods of high and low 
volatility, emphasizing the fact that this is a price process consisting of conditional 
heteroskedasticity. The volatility was particularly high around 2008, in the same period the 
world faced a huge food crisis with all time high prices, described in section 4.1. In fact, in 
mid-2008 the prices of wheat, corn, rise and soybeans were more than two times the observed 
levels in 2006102. 
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Figure 8.1 The conditional volatility plot of the wheat price changes. 
At the same time, several aspects of the commodity market also experienced huge changes 
such as an increase in the number of futures traded, and in the volume of open interest 
contracts, as shown in section 4.4. This observation together with the empirical evidence from 
this thesis and other qualitative investigations in the field, could give an indication of the need 
to regulate this market. Destabilization of the commodity market affects many of the world 
citizens, both financially and physically, and it should receive more attention than it does 
today. 
 
8.3 Discussion 
	  
The majority of the research on this phenomenon provides evidence against the linkage 
between commodity futures speculation and the commodity spot price. Bohl and Stephan 
(2013) got similar result for aggregate trading volume and open interest as the result from this 
analysis, but they found no statistical significant effect of the speculative open interest. Kim 
(2015) did not find any evidence that speculators destabilize the commodity spot market, in 
fact the presented findings show that speculators contributes to lower the price volatility103. 
Algieri (2012) had a slightly different measure on the speculative activity in the commodity 
markets. The quantitative analysis provided evidence that excessive speculation drives price 
volatility104. Excessive speculation occurs when the price of the derivatives do not reflect the 
physical market pricing. This is more similar to the findings from the quantitative analysis in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 (Kim, 2015) 
104 (Algieri, 2012)	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this paper, were it seems to exist a small linkage. Even though its small, one should not totally 
reject that there could exist some kind of link here. The problem is that it is not as easy as we 
want it to be to gather the right information to a possible analysis. CFTC`s COT report is not 
very transparent and it is not perfectly accurate. The reason for this is that companies have to 
report their positions to the CFTC themselves, and we cannot be completely certain that this is 
the accurate information. It is definitely clear that there needs to be more research on the 
phenomenon to be able to provide more evidence that there could be or not be a linkage.  
	  
9 Conclusion 
	  
In this paper, the purpose was to assess whether speculative activity in the commodity futures 
market affect the commodity spot prices. In the first sections, different theories and dynamics 
of the financial and the agricultural commodity market were presented to, and 
political/institutional features of the market was also discussed to illustrate the huge changes 
that have been implemented since the millennium especially. The price of wheat was further 
investigated, as well as the observed changes in wheat futures trading volume, open interest 
and the so-called speculative open interest. The time period studied in this paper consist of the 
last 15 years. In this period there where periods were the wheat price rose and fell 
substantially. There is applied an general autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(GARCH) model to investigate if the observed changes in the commodity futures market 
affect the volatility of the wheat price return process, which may affect the spot price itself. 
This paper provides evidence that speculators in the futures market could contribute to 
increasing the spot price volatility. The result supports the literature that future speculation 
destabilizes the spot markets. Wheat futures trading volume provides a positive effect, 
meaning that it increases the conditional volatility of the wheat price process. The open 
interest in the wheat futures commodity market provides a negative effect, implying that it 
decreases the conditional volatility, and the speculative open interest defined in the paper 
provides a positive effect, which again means that it increases the conditional volatility of the 
wheat price process, and this holds given everything else in the model. Weekly data were used 
in the quantitative analysis because of the information available in the time of the study.  
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9.1 Future research 
	  
Financialization is a way of describing the institutional changes in the market, but the 
consequence of this change is widely debated and it needs further investigation. The result of 
this investigation can affect millions of people, especially in developing countries. If the 
majority of researchers provide significant evidence that the observed financialization of the 
commodity market do affect the commodity spot prices, regulations should be introduced to 
protect those who are most vulnerable to these price changes. Future research should involve 
bigger datasets, including (for example) daily data to catch up the daily fluctuations in the 
price processes as well. This could provide better volatility estimates for the GARCH-model. 
The CFTC`s COT report only include weekly data, so the majority of researchers in the field 
has used weekly datasets as used in this thesis. Another issue that should be emphasized is the 
presence of non-normality in the residuals of the model. Even though the GARCH model was 
able to capture some of the leptokurtosis in the unconditional distribution of the wheat price 
changes, it could not capture all of it, and hence the residual is not normally distributed. 
Because of this, a different variance-covariance matrix estimator that is robust to non-
normality should be used in future research regarding the phenomenon. Such a procedure is 
developed by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992), and is known as the quasi-maximum 
likelihood (QML)105.	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A APPENDIX 
	  
A1 More details about the wheat price process 
	  
As stated in section 7.1, the wheat price process seems to be non-stationary, but after 
differencing the price process once, it becomes stationary. Figure A1.1 shows the 
autocorrelation plot of the raw wheat prices and the price changes. 
	   	  
Figure A1.1 The autocorrelation plot of the weekly wheat price and the weekly wheat price changes. 
There seems to be some decay towards zero in the first plot containing the raw data, but to 
determine if the process is stationary or not, an augmented Dickey-Fuller test was performed 
(result provided in table A1.1). The null hypothesis (which states that the process contains a 
unit root) could not be rejected; hence the process is not stationary. In the second plot, the 
process movement is quite different. It seems to fluctuate around zero, but it does not show a 
clear decay towards zero. A conclusion regarding the stationarity of the process could not be 
based only on this plot, so an augmented Dickey-Fuller test was performed here as well 
(result provided in table A1.2). In the weekly wheat price changes case, the null hypothesis 
were rejected, hence the process became stationary after it was differenced once.  
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller test wheat price 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% 
Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
Z(t)             -2.152            -3.430            -2.860            -2.570 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.2242 
 
Table A1.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test result of the what price process. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test wheat price changes 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% 
Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
Z(t)            -25.018            -3.430            -2.860            -2.570 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
 
Table A1.2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test result of the wheat price changes. 
Another issue with the dataset is the distribution. Figure A1.2 shows the histogram plot of the 
weekly wheat prices and the weekly wheat price changes measured as first differences. The 
transformation of the data results in a stationary process, but the process is not normally 
distributed. The process contains high peakedness in the mean as mentioned in section 7.1. 
Table A1.3 shows the result of the normality test of the weekly wheat price changes.  
	  
Figure A1.2 Histogram plot weekly wheat price raw data and weekly wheat price changes. 
	  
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
    Variable |        Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z 
      dprice |        752    0.94557     26.488     8.019    0.00000 
	  
Table A1.3 Result of the Shapiro-Wilk test of the weekly wheat price changes 
The null hypothesis is rejected in the normality test, and this underpins the fact that the 
weekly wheat price changes are not normally distributed. This is important to keep in mind 
when interpreting the result of the model. This implies that the GARCH(1,1) model probably 
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will provide inappropriate standard error estimates, because they are estimated under a 
normality assumption when they in fact are not, but the parameters estimates will still be 
consistent if the mean and variance is correctly specified106. 
 
A2 More about Stationarity 
	  
The stationarity or non-stationarity of a series strongly influences its properties and behavior. 
The classification of the series differs in many ways, and one of the main differences is the 
way a model containing the underlying series reacts to a change or an unexpected change in 
the series or in the error term during a particular period107. If a series is stationary, the shocks 
to the system will gradually die away. If a series in non-stationary, the persistence of shocks 
will always be infinite, and the effect of the shocks will not have a smaller effect through 
time. Another problem with using non-stationary variables in a model is that the standard 
assumptions for asymptotic analysis will not be valid. The t-ratios will not follow a t-
distribution and the F-statistics will not follow an F-distribution108. This makes it impossible 
to use hypothesis tests about the regression parameters regarding its validity if the data is non-
stationary. There are many ways of defining stationarity, Tsay (2010) state that a time series 
”is said to be strictly stationary if the joint distribution of (rt1,….,rtk) is identical to that of 
(rt1+t,….,rtk+t) for all t, where k is an arbitrary positive integer and (t1,….,tk) is a collection of k 
positive integers” (Tsay, 2010, p.30).  A more analytical presentation can be presented by 
focusing on two elements of a process, the random variable at time Xt, and a random variable 
that is associated with a future (or past) point in time t-τ where τ ∈   ℕ. Set τ < 0, then we are 
looking at an instance in the future relative to Xt. The auto-covariance of this process can be 
defined as109: 
                                   C[Xt, Xt - τ] = E[(Xt – E[Xt])( Xt – τ – E[Xt – τ])]                              (A2.1) 
The expected value at each point in time equals µ, E[Xt] = µ for t ∈ Т = {1,2,…,T} and thus 
the expression in (A2.1) simplifies to: 
                                             C[Xt, Xt - τ] = E[(Xt – µ)( Xt – τ – µ)]                                     (A2.2) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 (Brooks, 2008, p.399) 
107 (Brooks, 2008, p. 319) 
108 (Brooks, 2008, p. 320) 
109 (Jungeilges, 2015)	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which is the same as 
                                        C[Xt, Xt - τ] = E[XtXt-τ – µ(Xt – τ + Xt) + µ2]                              (A2.3) 
The expected value is a linear operator and the expected value of a constant is the constant 
itself, (A3.3) can be represented as  
                                     C[Xt, Xt - τ] = E[XtXt-τ] – µE[Xt – τ + Xt] + µ2                               (A2.4) 
If we have a case of two stochastically independent random variables X and Y, one can 
establish E[XY]=E[X]E[Y], therefore 
                                C[Xt, Xt - τ] = E[Xt]E[Xt – τ] – µ(E[Xt – τ] + E[Xt]) + µ2                      (A2.5) 
                                                   = µ2 – µ(2µ) + µ2                                                             (A2.6) 
                                                   = 2 µ2 - 2 µ2 = 0                                                              (A2.7) 
The auto-covariance function equals zero for any lag τ ≠ 0, and for τ = 0 the expression E[(Xt 
– E[Xt])( Xt – τ – E[Xt – τ])] reduces to E[(Xt – E[Xt])(Xt - E[Xt])] which is equal to E[(Xt - 
E[Xt])2] which represents the variance of the random variable Xt and its equal to σ2. 
Therefore, when the auto-correlation function of a process equals zero for all t and all values 
of τ, the process is both mean and variance stationary according to the specification given 
above, and this process is referred to as a white noise process. This is an example of a strictly 
stationary process.  
The form of stationarity described above is often hard to verify empirically, so a weaker from 
of stationarity is often assumed. Tsay (2010) states that “a time-series {rt} is weakly 
stationary if both the mean of rt and the covariance between rt and rt-k are time invariant, were 
k is an arbitrary integer”110 (Tsay, 2010, p.30). If a series satisfies: 
                                                             E(Xt) = µ                                                             (A2.8) 
                                                       E(Xt – µ)(Xt – µ) = σ2 < ∞                                       (A2.9) 
                                 E(Xt1 – µ)(Xt2 – µ) = C(Xt1,Xt2) – C(Xt,Xt1) =  γt2 - t1                      (A2.10) 
then the series is said to be weakly stationary111. This can also be referred to as a covariance 
stationary process because the covariance between two observations only depends on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 (Tsay, 2010, p.30) 
111 (Brooks, 2008, p.208) 
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length of time separating the observations112. Most economic series are trended, and the 
concept of trend-stationarity allows for deterministic trends, and it is further described in 
appendix A3. 
	  
	  
A3 Random Walk definition 
	  
Random walk processes are non-stationary processes. They are often referred to as a random 
walk with drift or a trend-stationary process113. A more formal definition is114: 
                                                         Xt = f (t) + Xt-1 + et                                                                              (A3.1) 
were t = {0,1,….,∞}, f is any function such that f : ℝ and an i.i.d variable et for which E[et] = 
0 and V[et] = 𝜎!! < ∞ exist. Assume X0 =  x0  ∈ ℝ, then (A3.1) constitutes a random walk 
process. Many trending financial time series can be characterized by a trend stationary 
process or a random walk with drift, and the formal description of these processes is given 
by115: 
                                      yt = γ0 + γ1t + ut  (Trend-Stationary)                                             (A3.2) 
                                   yt = δ1 + yt-1 + ut (Random walk with drift)                                     (A3.3) 
were ut is a white noise process, which means that E[ut] = 0 and V[ut] = σ2. If a non-stationary 
series must be differenced n times before it becomes stationary, then it is said to be integrated 
of order n: I(n)116. An I(0) process is a stationary process, while a I(1) process contains a unit 
root. A I(1) process must be differenced once in order to get stationary. (A3.2) and (A3.3) are 
processes that is integrated of order one, denoted by I(1). In order to choose the right process 
to describe the dynamics of the underlying data, a test for the presence of unit roots can be 
performed. One way of testing this is nest both cases into a general model with 
specification117: 
                                      yt = γ0 + γ1t + α[yt-1 - γ0 – γ1(t-1)] + ut                                                              (A3.4) 
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if 𝛼  = 1 we have a case of random walk with drift specification, and if α < 1 we have a 
trend-stationary specified process. To be able to construct a proper way of testing this, some 
re-parametrization is performed: 
                                                     yt = β0 + β1t + αyt-1 + ut,                                                (A3.5) 
                                                        β0 = γ0(1 – α) + γ1α; 
                                                        β1 = γ1(1 - α). 
Subtracting yt-1 from both sides: 
                                                 ∆ yt = β0 + β1t + (α – 1) yt-1 + ut,                                       (A3.6) 
if α < 1 we have a case of a trend-stationary process and if α = 1 we are facing a random walk 
with drift. The test statistics of unit roots are: 
                                              H0: (α – 1) = 0              H1: (α – 1) < 0 
If α = 1, the underlying series under investigation is non-stationary. 
	  
A4 Properties of ML estimators 
	  
The parameters of the ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model are estimated by maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation. This estimation technique provides optimal properties for the 
estimators produced by this approach. One of the relevant properties is the invariance 
property118: 
1. “Let g denote continuous function. If 𝜃 is a MLE for θ then g(𝜃) is a MLE for g(θ)” 
(Jungeilges, 2015, lec.2 p.6) 
For large samples, the ML estimators are the minimum variance unbiased estimator of θ. In 
the small sample case, the ML estimators are not always unbiased or minimum variance 
estimators, because unbiasedness means that E[θ] = θt where θ is an estimator of θ (were θt is 
its true value) and E[.] is the expectation operator and the ML estimator θ takes the true value 
with minimum variance in the limit as the size of the sample increase to infinity. This can also 
be referred to as the property of consistency119.  
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2. “Let θ! denote a ML estimator of the parameter θ based on a random sample of size n 
from fX(X, θ). Then  θ! ~ N(θ,ξn) where      
                                       
                                                 ξn = 
!!!"[!! !"!!(!;!)!!! ] 
the sequence of ML estimators θ! is the best asymptotically normal (BAN)” 
(Jungeilges, 2015, lec.2 p.7). 
These properties makes the ML estimators asymptotic efficient and asymptotic normal120. The 
variance of the estimators is determined by the Rao-Cramer lower bund. Because of the 
features described above, the ML estimators are asymptotically normally distributed in the 
limit of large samples, and this makes it possible to use standard statistical tests. 
 
A5 Testing the result of the main model 
	  
For the result of the test to be as valid and as optimal as possible, there should not exist serial-
correlation in the residuals of the model, and the residual should be normally distributed. 
Figure A5.1 displays a histogram plot of the residuals of the result of the main model, and 
table A5.1 shows the result of the normality test. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Figure A5.1 Histogram plot of the residuals of the ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model. 
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  Shapiro-­‐Wilk	  W	  test	  for	  normal	  data	  
	  	  	  	  Variable	  |	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Obs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  W	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  V	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  z	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Prob>z	  
	  	  	  	  resgarch	  |	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  752	  	  	  	  0.94626	  	  	  	  	  26.155	  	  	  	  	  7.988	  	  	  	  0.00000	  
	  
Table A5.1 Result Shapiro-Wilk test of the residuals of the ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model. 
According to the Shapiro-Wilk test, the residual of the model is not normally distributed. The 
histogram plot shows that we have a more leptokurtic distribution rather than a normal 
distribution. This is very normal for financial data, and this does not necessarily make the 
result of the main model invalid, but other alternative probability density functions for the 
conditional returns should be tested to see if they capture the fat tails and asymmetry better 
than the method used in this thesis. Verhoeven and McAleer (2004) examined different 
probability density functions and the result of their study show that GARCH-models that are 
estimated using asymmetric leptokurtic distributions are better than those estimated under 
normality in terms of capturing skewness and leptokurtosis and when estimating the 
maximum likelihood values.121  
Another important feature of the residual of the model is presence of serial-correlation. The 
residual should not be serial-correlated in order for the result to be valid. Table A5.2 shows 
the result of the Q-test. 
Portmanteau test for white noise 
Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    52.6712 
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.0865 
	  
Table A5.2 Result of the Portmanteau test of the residuals of the ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model. 
According to the test for serial-correlation provided in table A5.2, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that states that there is no serial-correlation; hence the residual is not serial-
correlated. It should be mentioned that this result is at a 5 per cent significance level. The null 
hypothesis can be rejected at a 10 per cent level. So even though the conclusion is that there is 
no serial-correlation in the residual, it is not as robust as desired. However, this means that in 
this analysis, the residual is not serial-correlated; hence this underpins the validity of the result 
of the model.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 (Verhoeven & McAleer, 2004, p.351) 
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A6 DO-FILE STATA 
	  
import excel "\\uia.no\Student\KRS\u07$\serind10\Desktop\STATAklar-sett2long (2).xlsx", 
sheet("Ark1") firstrow 
generate DATE=date(date,"DMY") 
format %tw DATE 
generate t=tw(2000w41)+_n-1 
format t %tw 
tsset t 
tsline price 
tsline OI 
tsline TV 
tsline SpecOI 
ac price 
wntestq price 
dfuller price 
generate dprice=price-L1.price 
tsline dprice 
ac dprice 
pac dprice 
wntestq dprice 
dfuller dprice 
generate wrprice=(price-L1.price)/L1.price 
tsline wrprice 
ac wrprice 
wntestq wrprice 
dfuller wrprice 
histogram dprice, normal 
swilk dprice 
histogram wrprice, normal 
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swilk wrprice 
arima dprice, arima(1,0,0) 
arima dprice, noconstant arima(1,0,0) 
predict res, residual 
gen res2=res*res 
regress res2 L1.res2 
histogram res 
tsline res 
wntestq res 
arima dprice, noconstant arima(1,0,1) 
estat ic 
arima dprice, noconstant arima(1,0,1) 
predict resarma, residual 
gen resarma2=resarma*resarma 
regress resarma2 L1.resarma2 
wntestq resarma 
tsline resarma 
arima dprice, noconstant arima(1,1,1) 
estat ic 
arima dprice, noconstant arima(0,0,1) 
estat ic 
arima dprice, noconstant arima(2,0,0) 
estat ic 
arima dprice, noconstant arima(2,0,1) 
arima dprice, noconstant arima(2,0,2) 
estat ic 
histogram dprice, normal 
histogram price, normal 
summarize price, detail 
summarize dprice, detail 
swilk dprice 
swilk price 
generate dOI=OI-L1.OI 
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generate dTV=TV-L1.TV 
generate dspecOI=SpecOI-L1.SpecOI 
dfuller dOI 
dfuller dTV 
dfuller dspecOI 
arch dprice, noconstant arch(1/1) garch(1/1) het(dTV dOI dspecOI) 
arch dprice, noconstant ar(1) ma(1) arch(1/1) garch(1/1) het(L1.dTV L1.dOI L1.dspecOI) 
predict resgarch, residual 
histogram resgarch, normal 
wntestq resgarch 
corrgram resgarch 
wntestq resgarch, lags(40) 
wntestq resgarch, lags(100) 
wntestq resgarch, lags(1) 
swilk resgarch 
summarize resgarch, detail 
predict garch, variance 
tsline garch 
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